







2015 was a difficult year for many Muslims in Belgium. Following Belgium-based terrorist activities, the fight against radicalism and terrorism was high on political and media agendas, and a sharp increase of Islamophobia-related actions was visible as well.​[2]​ There were diverse initiatives from within the Muslim communities to distance themselves from radicalism and to contribute to interfaith dialogue.
Foreign influence, most notably from Turkey and the Gulf states, was another source of concern. If Turkish-backed positions were strongly (re)affirmed, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait interventions were much more discreet. Voices in favour of an “Islam from Belgium” were heard again but these were divided as there is no consensual view on what this Islam from Belgium would be nor who could produce it.
There were few legal developments other than in the “security” field, except projects in the French-speaking part of the country on Muslim leaders’ training. The French-speaking-part considered setting up Muslim programmes on public TV channels, while Flanders closed them down; this example shows the impact of Belgium’s complex federal structure on relations between public authorities and religious and philosophical communities.​[3]​ The prohibition of slaughtering without stunning, especially in temporary slaughter-houses, was generally implemented, generating some angry reactions from within Muslim communities.





Public debates covered a wide range of topics, from shared values to church-state relations, through religious leaders’ training, radicalism, integration, discrimination and Islamophobia, interfaith dialogue, and debates around “living together.” The perception of an increasing Muslim presence in Belgium was further fuelled by media coverage of radical groupings or activists and by the influx of mostly Muslim migrants.
Radicalism has been a major concern for both Muslims and public authorities, mainly through terrorist activities, the departures of foreign fighters to Syria/Iraq, and hate speeches. Reactions, either political or from the Muslim communities, have been very diverse and have covered a wide spectrum. 
This prompted the reopening of the debate on the inclusion of the principle of laïcité in the Constitution. Even though this had already been regularly proposed (and rejected) since the early 2000s, the main argument put forward this time was to reaffirm values in the face of increasing religious extremism.​[5]​ Similarly, some political parties drafted documents on such issues; for instance, Mouvement réformateur (Reform Movement, centre-right liberals), the only French-speaking party in the federal coalition government, launched reflections in multiculturalism and suggested various measures, generally opposing reasonable accommodation.​[6]​
If the primary objective of religious leaders’ training programmes is to enhance the quality of religious and moral assistance to believers, such programmes have also been considered useful components of anti-radicalisation policies, based on the hypothesis that a better trained clergy was better equipped to counter radical speeches and attitudes.​[7]​ Programmes in higher education initiated previously in the Flemish Community​[8]​ were continued. In the French-speaking Community, a commission was set up in order to present proposals on the basis of research submitted to the Minister of Higher Education in 2014.​[9]​ The Commission’s report, handed over on 4 December 2015,​[10]​ proposed various short and long term measures, from complementary training for imams, to the possible organisation of an Islamic Theology Faculty or a reinforced coordination and support for existing courses and initiatives in French-speaking universities. Concrete steps for the organisation of radio and television programmes on public channels were also proposed. These various proposals received a positive response of the Minister in charge​[11]​ but have yet to be implemented.
Police and anti-terrorist measures were based on the important presence of Belgian fighters in Syria and Iraq as well as Belgium-based terrorist activities in Belgium and France. Recent reports confirm that Belgium has the highest per capita ratio of foreign fighters in Syria. Estimates range between 410 and 510 individuals, with an average age of 25.7, among which 47 are women and 6% are converts; 45% were from the Brussels Capital Region (most notably Molenbeek),​[12]​ 45% from Flanders (mainly Antwerp, Vilvoorde, and Mechelen) and 10% from Wallonia; 79 could be linked to Sharia4Belgium; 180 to 260 are still abroad, 60 to 70 confirmed dead and 55 to 130 returned. At least five are fighting in the ranks of the Assad regime.​[13]​
The most spectacular counter-terrorism operations were carried out in Brussels, Halle-Vilvoorde, and Verviers. In the latter city, a terrorist cell made up of three people having returned from Syria was put out of action on 15 January 2015, two – both from Molenbeek – were killed​[14]​ and later praised by ISIS in a message that also threatened Belgium.​[15]​ After these operations, the alert level in Belgium was raised to level 3, on a scale of 4, from 16 January to 9 March 2015, leading to military being deployed to protect possible targets, such as police installations. On 22 November 2015, the Belgian connections of the terrorists who acted in Paris on 13 November 2015 were established and the alert level was raised to level 4 for the Brussels Capital Region,​[16]​ leading to schools, metro, and shopping centres being closed, and to the military being deployed in Brussels and some other city centres.
Numerous trials took place in 2015. One of the most illustrative – due to its connections to other European countries and the Middle East – is the one of Sharia4Belgium that opened on 29 September 2014.​[17]​ 45 people were charged, including the leader of the group, Fouad Belkacem. The judgement was pronounced on 11 February 2015 and stated: “The Court concluded that Sharia4Belgium is a terrorist group, as were the two Syrian groups that were joined by different members of Sharia4Belgium. Several accused are condemned as leaders, others as active members of a terrorist group. The Court also established that Sharia4Belgium has played an active role in the departure of several fighters to Syria.”​[18]​
Some tensions and hate speeches towards minority groups (most notably Shi’is)​[19]​ and Jews​[20]​ continued. Measures were taken against some imams considered radical. The imam of a Somali Verviers-based mosque was ordered to leave Belgian territory in July 2015 after hate speeches but his appeal was still pending in November 2015.​[21]​
A theatre play entitled Djihad,​[22]​ written by Ismaël Saidi, achieved a considerable success. Portraying three young jihadis’ misadventures, it was performed in theatres, schools (more than 10,000 pupils attended it) and on TV, always followed by a debate or interactions between the writer – himself an actor in the play – and the audience.​[23]​ The play’s success later spread to France.​[24]​ The author’s other ideas to promote an open vision of Islam and to counter radicalism through video clips, developed with Michaël Privot and Rachid Benzine and supported by Brussels capital Region’s President, faced strong reactions among fringe elements of Muslim communities and were eventually withdrawn.​[25]​
Unia​[26]​ data detected an increase in Islamophobia. In 2015, 1,596 complaints were filed compared to 1,670 in 2014. While this is an overall decrease in the total number, the number of cases of discrimination based on religious or philosophical motives increased. The three main discrimination criteria in 2015 were race (38% of the claims), disability (22%) and religious or philosophical affiliations (19% compared to 16% in 2014). The latter reflects a trend as the number of complaints has steadily climbed from 185 in 2010 to 330 in 2015, a 78% increase. Muslim victims represent 93% of the complaints received in 2015. Unia considers that racism is nowadays expressed in religious terms rather than on the basis of skin colour or nationality. A Muslim-organisation, Collectif contre l’Islamophobie en Belgique (Collective against Islamophobia in Belgium, CCIB), observed a sharp increase in Islamophobia, counting 28 acts in the first nine months of 2015 compared to 13 in 2014.​[27]​ There are questions as to the validity of these figures, as “Islamophobia” as such is not listed in statistics, circumscribing the possibility to initiate criminal proceedings.​[28]​





Despite a large proportion of Muslims holding Belgian citizenship, links of various kinds with countries of origin remain, more specifically in the cases of Muslims of Moroccan and Turkish backgrounds. The influence of Gulf States has also been noted.
Every year, the King Hassan II Foundation sends dozens of imams and other clerics to Belgium during the Ramadan period in order to support permanent imams during this busy time.​[30]​ Besides that, Moroccan organisations in Belgium have personal rather than institutional links with Morocco. Some therefore consider that the influence of Morocco on Belgian Muslims is declining.​[31]​ Moroccan community organisations being scattered in various – sometimes antagonistic – factions does not help and leaves them with much less influence than Turkish community organisations which are very well organised through Diyanet. The main umbrella organisation for Moroccan mosques in Belgium is the Rassemblement des Musulmans de Belgique (Union of Muslims in Belgium, RMB), which receives financial support from Morocco. If the Moroccan embassy discreetly supports the RMB (the ambassador attends most important RMB’s events), it does not do so to interfere in Belgian political debates, rather to support Belgian authorities as a general rule. As an example, it was announced that Moroccan policemen would collaborate with the Belgian police in Antwerp, Brussels, Verviers, and Vilvoorde from 2016 onwards, with the aim of countering radical preachers and potential foreign fighters.​[32]​
The situation is different in Turkish mosques funded and supported by the Belgian-based branch of the Turkish Presidency of Religious Affairs (Belçika Diyanet Vakfi). Turkish officials are present at mosque openings and, when recognised, most of these mosques prefer to leave unoccupied imam posts that could be paid by the Belgian state, resorting instead to imams sent by Diyanet, who usually hold four-year tenures. Their theological training is not questioned, but their knowledge of Belgian languages and customs is. Diyanet is currently addressing this problem by providing imam training in Turkey to young Muslims of Turkish background from Belgium or France.
Turkish community organisations were in the spotlight in 2015 as some MPs of Turkish descent were uncomfortable with commemorations of the 100th anniversary of the Armenian genocide. The press underlined the low profile of the French-speaking Socialist Party (PS), guessing it had no intention to anger parts of its electorate,​[33]​ while the French-speaking centrists (CDH) excluded the Member of the Brussels Parliament Mahinur Özdemir, the first ever head scarf-wearing MP in Belgium,​[34]​ bringing numerous and varied Turkish reactions, including from the ruling AKP in Turkey.​[35]​ This also raised more widely the question of a potential conflict of loyalties facing politicians with a migrant background.​[36]​
Numerous demonstrations also took place in support of the Turkish president (such as in Hasselt, drawing 15,000 people, on 10 May,​[37]​ or in Brussels on 23 May 2015), or in protest against him (as in Brussels in October 2015).​[38]​ The Gülen-leaning International Festival of Language and Culture (IFLC) – unwelcome in Turkey – gathered 7,000 people in Brussels in June.​[39]​
On 6 October 2015, the 25th Europalia Festival was inaugurated in Brussels, in presence of King Philippe of Belgium and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The 2015 festival was devoted to Turkey, and many cultural events took place,​[40]​ with various political dimensions and reactions,​[41]​ most notably from the Armenian community and some other minorities from Turkey.​[42]​
The Saudi-based Muslim World League keeps an important presence in Belgium. Belgian authorities chose to give the Saudi-backed CICB (also known as Grande Mosquée or Mosquée du Cinquantenaire) the role of representing all Muslims in Belgium in the 1970-80s. Despite the CICB having been stripped of this role of representation, its ideological influence remains strong through its activities, as well as through some imams it has trained and members of the General Assembly of the Executif des Musulmans de Belgique (Executive of Muslims in Belgium, EMB) close to it. It occupies a building belonging to Belgian authorities, benefiting from a lease that has been questioned in Parliament and the media while the Minister of the Interior announced a security check by the Security of State (Sûreté de l’Etat).​[43]​ This question was also instrumentalised by the Flemish far-right party Vlaams Blok that proposed an inquiry commission on the “possibility to forbid international funding from Muslim fundamentalist circles to mosques and Islamic institutes.”​[44]​
Qatar and Kuwait provide some financial support to mosques and other organisations. Detailed and verified information is rare but, as an example, the 2014 accounts of the Ligue des Musulmans de Belgique (League of Muslims in Belgium, LMB) filed in 2015 show financial support from charities from Qatar and Kuwait in the amount of €1.2 million.​[45]​


Law and Domestic Politics

The system of Belgian church-State relations is based on the recognition of religious denominations and philosophical organisations.​[46]​ There was no piece of legislation regarding Islam specifically in Belgium in 2015 and the few publications in the Official Journal (Moniteur Belge) refer to the funding of the Executive of Muslims in Belgium, broadcasting time in Flanders, and the approval of budgets or accounts of recognised mosques. 
Broadcasting on public radio and television channels has followed divergent courses in the Flemish Community, where it ended on 31 December 2015, and in the French-speaking Community, where a Commission proposed setting up such broadcasts in 2016.​[47]​
Various authorities and some Muslim organisations established or updated plans or took measures to deal with radicalism. Some of these are classified. These plans have a broad remit. A new article has been introduced in the chapter on terrorism of the Criminal Code;​[48]​ it punishes leaving or entering Belgian territory in order to commit terrorist acts. A Radicalism Unit was set up in 2014 within the federal Ministry of the Interior. Among other activities, it coordinates the STRESAVIORA (Strengthening Resilience against Violent Radicalisation) project, which is supported by the European Commission. Measures relative to information exchanges and to track “foreign fighters” have also been adopted.​[49]​
A National Task Force (NTF) was set up and is coordinated by the Organe de Coordination pour l’Analyse de la Menace (Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment, OCAM).​[50]​ Participants are federal and local police, Sûreté de l’Etat (State Security, VS-SE), Military Intelligence, Department of Foreign Affairs, Cellule de Traitement de l’Information Financière (Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit, CTIF) and Office des Etrangers (Immigration Office). Communities and Regions started participating in 2015. The federal plan is called Plan R; it was enlarged in 2015 to include the foreign fighters’ issue and to develop preventive measure, hence the inclusion of Communities and Regions. On 29 January 2015, the Walloon government adopted a so-called Walloon radicalism plan (Plan radicalisme wallon) with the aim of coordinating the detection and prevention of radicalism. The prevention aspect stresses not only the social and professional integration of residents who are either foreign or of foreign backgrounds, but also the role of local religious communities (including mosques). In April 2015, the Flemish government adopted a 40-point plan later presented to Parliament: it combined support to local authorities, initiatives to counter radical discourses in schools, better integration and language knowledge for migrants, etc., as well as improved imam training and various measures regarding mosques.​[51]​ The budget is estimated at €1.2 million. This plan received support from all parties within the Flemish parliament, except the far-right Vlaams Belang.​[52]​ The Flemish parliament established a follow-up commission for the Government’s plan and some parliamentary proposals were put forward, such as a “Concept paper for new regulations on tackling radicalisation, focusing on the prevention of radicalisation processes that can lead to extremism and terrorism.”​[53]​ Phone hotlines were also established by various authorities and departments.
Under-minister of the Brussels Capital Region Bianca Debaets developed initiatives for inter-faith dialogue, including a magazine titled Lueurs (Lights) with interviews of nine prominent faith or humanist leaders.​[54]​
Despite announcements in 2014,​[55]​ there was no federal or regional legislation to forbid the wearing of religious symbols by public servants providing frontline services.​[56]​ A decision by a Labour Court in November 2015 was in favour of employees of the Brussels Capital Region Employment Service wearing the head scarf despite new internal regulations forbidding it. The Court found that the Belgian principle of neutrality did not imply “exclusive” neutrality that would allow such a prohibition.​[57]​ On the other hand, the city of Verviers received a favourable decision on its ban of overt religious symbols (including the head scarf) for pupils.​[58]​
This is an example of debates around reasonable accommodation: with no legal framework, such debates resort either to informal local arrangements or end up in the courts, on a case-by-case base. Other debated items are female-only sport activities (fitness, swimming pools), prayer rooms, dress code, refusal of a male doctor, etc. The idea of adopting a legal framework has been put forward but a national approach is considered unrealistic since there is no consensus on the need for such a comprehensive legal framework, and because of the obstacles in implementing it across the multiple authorities within the complex Belgian federal structure.​[59]​
Despite an increasing number of halal-labelled products, there are multiple certifications. The EMB is working on a common project with other actors​[60]​ but no solution has emerged yet. The Belgian halal market is worth an estimated €1.7 billion.​[61]​ More and more companies seek halal certification for their products​[62]​ and public export offices (such as AWEx in Wallonia) promote exports of halal products made in Belgium.​[63]​ Therefore, controversies and tensions remain, such as the one sparked when it became known that a traditional regional syrup from the Liège area was halal certified; a call for a boycott was launched​[64]​ in August 2015 and a local politician even returned a pot,​[65]​ neglecting to note the fact that such certification was favourable for exports.​[66]​
The organisation of animal slaughter for ‘Id al-Adha was very controversial in 2015. The EMB delivers two types of certificates for halal slaughter, one for professionals (valid for one year) and temporary certificates (valid for three days). Gaia (an animal rights association) pursued its campaign opposing slaughter without stunning, and launched a massive campaign by post and in the press​[67]​ in September 2015.​[68]​ Veterinary associations also expressed their opposition to ritual slaughtering.​[69]​ The basic piece of legislation is the law of 14 August 1986 on animal protection and welfare.​[70]​ Articles 15 and 16 forbid slaughtering without stunning, allowing exceptions for religious purposes in circumstances determined by the Government in agreement with the slaughterhouse. The Council of State decided in July 2015 that slaughtering without stunning in temporary slaughterhouses was illegal. In the Flemish Region, Minister Ben Weyts announced that slaughtering without stunning would end in 2015 in temporary slaughterhouses with the possible extension of prohibition to all slaughterhouses at a later date. This move was seen as electioneering aimed at gaining far-right voters.​[71]​ The Flemish local government association also issued guidelines for municipalities.​[72]​ In reaction, various Muslim organisations requested alternatives to be considered. 48 associations filed complaints against the decision of the Flemish government​[73]​ but the legality of the latter was confirmed in court.​[74]​
In Wallonia, where around 75% of cattle had been killed in temporary slaughterhouses in 2014, the Government negotiated with slaughterhouses (most of them private) and the EMB to ensure that slaughtering (without stunning) would take place in permanent slaughterhouses only but that these would have longer opening hours during three dedicated days.​[75]​ Temporary slaughterhouses were therefore not deployed in municipalities as in previous years. In the Brussels Capital Region, around 40% of the cattle had been killed in 2014 in the permanent Anderlecht slaughterhouse and slightly less than 60% in temporary installations in Schaerbeek, Molenbeek, and Brussels city.​[76]​ Temporary slaughterhouses were not prohibited by the Region in 2015 but some municipalities decided not to open them.​[77]​ 
Reactions among Muslim communities were diverse. Beside already mentioned EMB negotiations with regional authorities, there were calls for a boycott and invitations to use alternatives. Some fringe organisations tried to gain visibility with declarations and petitions on this matter,​[78]​ a clear instrumentalisation of the issue in an attempt to counterbalance the EMB or sometimes local mosques.
A compulsory integration course for non-EU immigrants (inburgering traject) had already existed in the Flemish Region. The Walloon Region adopted a largely voluntarily welcome course (parcours d’accueil) in 2014​[79]​ and decided in September 2015 to turn it into a larger compulsory programme, with 120 hours of French as a foreign language, 20 hours on citizenship plus a social/professional integration unit.​[80]​ The Brussels Capital Region followed the move, taking a similar decision in December 2015 and planning compulsory attendance from 2017 onwards.​[81]​ Such changes were prompted by the influx of migrants and the parallel question of how to instil in them the “values of our society.” In the same prospect, the Federal government decided to only grant residence permits to foreigners who signed a document in which they subscribe to European values, freedoms, and constitutional principles.​[82]​


Activities and Initiatives of Main Muslim Organisations

The Executif des Musulmans de Belgique (Executive of Muslims in Belgium, EMB),​[83]​ was under various forms of pressure coming from several quarters. These included political, conservative, or radical fringes within Muslim communities and/or some groupings and personalities attempting to gain more influence, in the Belgian context and/or from foreign countries. Other parts of the communities, including progressive ones, were challenging what they considered the EMB’s lack of legitimacy or representativeness. These combined pressures turned into turmoil. If the administration of the Executive was still working,​[84]​ the Executive as such was in crisis (because of multiple factors such as internal conflicts, interpersonal tensions, appeals against the composition of the EMB, etc.) prompting parliamentary questions and ministerial action. The Minister in-charge announced profound changes in the organisation of the representation of Muslim communities (including a controversial split into French-speaking and Flemish-speaking wings) in 2015,​[85]​ implemented by a governmental decree on 15 February 2016.
While mosques in Flanders and Brussels are recognised on a case-by-case basis, Wallonia recognised a first batch of 43 in 2006 (39 remaining, four having lost their recognition due to administrative problems) but none has been recognised since, as Walloon provinces, citing budgetary constraints, have been reluctant to recognise the remaining mosques. These arguments were apparently set aside in the context of anti-radicalisation plans and 22 existing mosques appear set to be recognised in Wallonia in 2016. In Flanders, there were 28 recognised mosques at the end of 2015 and around 50 future recognitions were announced.​[86]​ In the Brussels Capital Region, only 14 out of 80 mosques are recognised, with seven more applications pending,​[87]​ others are apparently not seeking recognition.
In accordance with regional regulations, elections were held in most recognised mosques​[88]​ where committees had been elected five years ago. The process went smoothly, with rare exceptions showing tensions, sometimes initiated by more radical groups. In many cases, these elections brought new generations into power, with professional competencies (accounting etc.) but also often with a more vindictive posture towards established authorities.
New mosques opened (e.g. UCCIB mosque Selimiye in Saint-Josse, Brussels)​[89]​ while works started (e.g. Malmédy)​[90]​ or procedures initiated for others as in Fléron,​[91]​ Glain,​[92]​ La Louvière,​[93]​ and Beringen.​[94]​ Some mosques have some problems in terms of space, leading to new buildings, extensions of existing ones,​[95]​ or prayers performed on the street.​[96]​ At least one (in Maaseik) was temporarily closed after police searches.​[97]​
Demands have been increasing for Muslim parcels in cemeteries in various parts of the country. In Brussels, some municipalities belong to an inter-municipal organisation providing Muslim, Orthodox, and Jewish parcels, while some others have Muslim parcels in their municipal cemetery and yet others have none; hence, the question of inequality of treatment regarding the municipality of residence was raised in 2015.​[98]​
In public schools (run by Flemish, French- and German-speaking Communities, or local authorities), education in all recognised religions and non-confessional moral education are planned for two periods a week (being gradually reduced to one in the French-speaking Community). Exemptions (in the Flemish Community) or alternatives (Education in Philosophy and Citizenship or EPC, in the French-speaking Community) are possible. In all Communities, the number of pupils attending Islamic religion education classes increased. In the Flemish Community, 1,023 schools organised such classes in 2014-2015; among schools directly operated by the Flemish Community, 533 schools were concerned compared to 331 in 2006-2007, representing a 60% increase.​[99]​ In Antwerp municipality-run schools, Islamic religious education classes now draw an absolute majority of pupils.​[100]​ Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim educational institutions exist beside public (Community’s or local) ones.​[101]​ In addition to Muslim denominational primary schools, the first secondary school opened in 2015, La Vertu, organised by Enseignement Confessionel Islamique de Belgique (Islamic Denominational Schools in Belgium, ECIB).​[102]​ Other, non-denominational, schools also exist. Among these are Gülen-oriented initiatives, with Lucerna schools in the Flemish Community and Ecole des Etoiles (Stars’ School) in the French-speaking Community. One of these opened in Liège in 2015, after similar schools opened in Charleroi and Brussels. These schools, primarily aimed at a Turkish audience, are officially open to pupils from all religions.​[103]​ 
Various activities were set up in order to reaffirm the solidarity of Muslim communities with Belgian society as a whole and to prevent stereotyping Muslims as terrorists. With other recognised denominations, the Exécutif des Musulmans de Belgique (Executive of Muslims in Belgium, EMB) was a co-organiser of the demonstration “Together in Peace - Liberté et Respect - Vrijheid en Respect”​[104]​ that took place on 15 March 2015 and attracted some 3,500 people.​[105]​ Representatives of the EMB and/or from different Muslim associations took part at the various demonstrations against violence and in solidarity with terror victims.
Open-door events were more widely held in 2015 than in previous years, including at six mosques in Verviers,​[106]​ and school visits in Namur.​[107]​ Among other initiatives, Initiatives citoyennes pour un Islam de Belgique (Citizen’s Initiatives for Islam of Belgium, ICIB) held a joint press conference with the Comité de coordination des organisations juives de Belgique (Coordinating committee of Jewish associations of Belgium, CCOJB) to promote a better relationship and increased understanding between both communities, and to fight against racism.​[108]​ In Arlon, in a symbolic gesture, the Muslim community gave €2,405 to help restore the local listed synagogue.​[109]​


Muslim Population: History and Demographics

As Belgium did not own colonies with a Muslim majority or a significant Muslim population, the presence of Muslims in Belgium remained marginal​[110]​ until the signing of labour agreements with some Muslim majority countries, notably Turkey and Morocco, in 1964. The percentage of Muslims in the population has become a difficult and sensitive topic of debate, as illustrated by an Ipsos​[111]​ survey showing that the percentage of Muslims in Belgium is estimated by the Belgian population to be 29%, 23 points higher than it was in reality at the time. Attempts to put forward some estimates led to fiery debates among academics.​[112]​
In the absence of the registration of religious or philosophical affiliations, only estimates and surveys can be used.​[113]​ Detailed estimates are regularly produced by Jan Hertogen,​[114]​ based on countries of origin.​[115]​ He previously set a figure of around 716,000 Muslims or 6.5% of the Belgian population in 2013,​[116]​ and increased this to 7% in 2015.​[117]​ This can be compared with earlier data on the attendance of Islamic religious education classes, with 5.9% or even 6.9% of Muslim pupils frequenting Catholic schools in 2010-2011.​[118]​ All indicators show a regular increase in both the number and percentage of the Muslim population in Belgium, with estimates rising as high as 1 million, or 10.2% of the population by 2030.​[119]​

Muslim Population	Estimates on 1 January 2015 are 781,887 Muslims out of a population of 11,209,044. This represents 7% compared to 6.5% in 2013. 
Ethnic/National Backgrounds​[120]​	Moroccan: 332,224 (46.4% of Muslim population)Turkish: 179,558 (25.8%)Others: 204,696 (27.8%).​[121]​More than 91% and 93% respectively of Muslim Belgian residents of Moroccan or Turkish background now have Belgian citizenship; a large majority of them have dual citizenship.​[122]​ Converts (who are not counted here) have been estimated between 6,000 and around 30,000.​[123]​ 
Inner-Islamic Groups	There is no official data available on inner-Islamic groups. Shi’is are estimated at 10% of Muslims in Belgium.​[124]​ A majority of these is of Iranian background but they have been joined by converts from various backgrounds, including Belgians or Moroccans (these could amount to 18,000​[125]​ or even 40,000).​[126]​ Alevis are also present and have various organisations.
Geographical Spread	The Muslim population is unevenly spread in the country, concentrating mainly in some parts of Brussels​[127]​ and in (former) industrial and mining areas around Antwerp, Gent, Liège, Charleroi, and in the province of Limburg.The Muslim population is spread as follow:Brussels Capital Region: 35.5% (23.6% of the entire population) Flemish Region: 42.2% (5.1%)Walloon Region: 22.3% (4.9%).​[128]​
Number of Mosques	There are slightly fewer than 300 mosques; 292 decided to participate in the election of the Executive of Muslims in Belgium (EMB) in 2014 but only 284 sent delegates. According to the EMB, there are 68 to 80 mosques in Brussels Capital Region (18 recognised), 76 in Wallonia (39 recognised), and 151 in Flanders (28 recognised).​[129]​
Muslim Burial Sites​[130]​	A majority of Muslims of an immigrant background (especially Moroccans) prefer to be buried in their country of origin and sometimes purchase insurance that covers transportation costs. Places of burial in Belgium are segments within local cemeteries and are located in the following places:Brussels Capital Region:​[131]​-	In Forest, Etterbeek, and Anderlecht, plus interfaith sections in Schaerbeek​[132]​ cemetery (based on Evere and Zaventem territories), run by an inter-municipal organisation.Flemish Region: -	Province of West-Flanders: Oostende, Brugge, Roelselare, and Kortrijk-	Province of East-Flanders: Gent/Zwijnaarde, Ronse, and Sint-Niklaas-	Province of Flemish-Brabant: Leuven, and Tienen-	Province of Antwerp: Antwerp, Turnhout, and Mol-	Province of Limburg: Lommel, Neerpelt, Overpelt, Leopoldsburg, Beringen, Heuden-Zolder, Houthalen-Helchteren, Genk, Maaseik, Maasmechelen, and Sint-Truiden.Walloon Region:-	Province of Liège: Huy, Fleron, Robermont, and Jupille; another is planned in Cheratte-Bas (Visé)-	Province of Hainaut: Charleroi, Tournai, La Louvière, Farciennes, Mons, Manage, and Boussu-	Province of Namur: Andenne, Namur, and SambrevilleAs far as can be ascertained, there are none in the Walloon Brabant and Luxembourg Provinces.
“Chaplaincy” in State Institutions	Muslim chaplaincies exist in institutions for young offenders (less than a dozen chaplains), hospitals (rarely on an employment basis with the institution), and penitentiaries (17 chaplains but less than seven full-time equivalents in 2014; there is a plan to increase their number). Discussions of introducing a Muslim military chaplain have produced no results yet.​[133]​
Halal Products	Halal food is largely available, in small halal shops and in supermarkets,​[134]​ especially in Muslim-populated areas.Slaughtering without stunning is now forbidden in temporary slaughter-houses in the Flemish and Walloon Regions; it remains authorised in permanent slaughter-houses and in the Brussels Capital Region.​[135]​Halal meals are available in prisons; some prisons serve no-pork meals only in order to facilitate meal management.​[136]​
Places of Islamic Learning and Education	Muslim institutions recognised by the authorities (i.e. receiving public funding and issuing recognised diplomas/certificates):-	Association ECIB (Enseignement Confessionnel Islamique de Belgique) has launched a nursery and primary schools in the Brussels Capital Region: Al Ghazali (Etterbeek), La Plume (Molenbeek), La Vertu (Schaerbeek). A secondary school opened for the 2015-2016 school year. Once recognised, these schools receive the same funding as Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish institutions.Other Muslim institutions:These are not recognised by public authorities or the EMB. Despite considering themselves institutions of higher education, their diplomas and certificates are not recognised in Belgium. They do not receive any public funding. All are based in the Brussels Capital Region.-	European Islamic Institute (Institut Islamique Européen), linked to the Centre Islamique et Culturel de Belgique and the Muslim World League, www.centreislamique.be/fr/homepage.-	Faculté des Sciences Islamiques de Bruxelles (FSIB), www.faculte-islamique.be.-	Alkhayria Belgica runs regular conferences and courses in Islamic sciences, www.alkhayria.org (​http:​/​​/​www.alkhayria.org​).




-	Executive of Muslims in Belgium (Exécutif des Musulmans de Belgique – Executieve van de Moslims van Belgïe, EMB, Rue de Laeken 166-168, 1000 Brussels, tel.: ++32 22100230, www.embnet.be (​http:​/​​/​www.embnet.be​), Facebook page: www.facebook.com/Ex%C3%A9cutif-des-Musulmans-de-BelgiqueExecutief-van-de-Moslims-van-Belgi%C3%AB-476351699186357/ (​http:​/​​/​www.facebook.com​/​Ex%C3%A9cutif-des-Musulmans-de-BelgiqueExecutief-van-de-Moslims-van-Belgi%C3%AB-476351699186357​/​​)). As the representative body to the Belgian authorities, it is recognised and financed by the Federal government. In 2014, its members were elected in a general assembly chosen among mosques’ representatives.​[141]​
-	Council of Theologians (Conseil des Théologiens, same address as EMB). In connection with the EMB, the Council of Theologians provides answers to questions submitted by the EMB, local mosques, or other national or international religious organisations, and reflects on religious and theological questions relevant to Muslims in Belgium. Any imam hired by a recognised mosque is submitted to the Council for approval. The Council determines the start date of Ramadan and intervenes in public debates.​[142]​
-	Coordination Council of Islamic Institutions (Conseil de coordination des institutions islamiques). Up to now a more discreet body, it was also set up in the context of the 2014 designation of the EMB; its role is to intervene in public debates on behalf of Muslim communities whereas the EMB role is limited to “church”-state relations.
-	Diyanet (Belçika Diyanet Vakfi – Diyanet de Belgique – Diyanet van Belgïe, Chaussée de Haecht 67, 1210 Brussels, tel.: ++32 22185755, www.diyanet.be (​http:​/​​/​www.diyanet.be​) (in Turkish)). Coordinates all mosques linked to the Turkish government.
-	Union of Muslims in Belgium (Rassemblement des Musulmans de Belgique, RMB, Boulevard Baudouin 18, 1000 Brussels, Facebook page: www.facebook.com/pages/Rassemblement-des-Musulmans-de-Belgique/541296152619233?fref=ts (​http:​/​​/​www.facebook.com​/​pages​/​Rassemblement-des-Musulmans-de-Belgique​/​541296152619233?fref=ts​)). Characterised by its links to Morocco and its commitment to dialogue with other religions.
-	Islamic and Cultural Centre of Belgium (Centre Islamique et Culturel de Belgique, CICB, Parc du Cinquantenaire 14, 1000 Brussels, www.centreislamique.be/en/homepage (​http:​/​​/​www.centreislamique.be​/​en​/​homepageF​), Facebook page: www.facebook.com/pages/Centre-Islamique-et-Culturel-de-Belgique-Bruxelles/236285763107429?fref=ts (​http:​/​​/​www.facebook.com​/​pages​/​Centre-Islamique-et-Culturel-de-Belgique-Bruxelles​/​236285763107429?fref=ts​)). A centre of the Saudi-based Muslim World League,​[143]​ it was the first contact organisation for Belgian authorities prior to the formation of the EMB.
-	Islamic Federation of Belgium (Fédération Islamique de Belgique - Belçika Islam Federasyonu, FIB-BIF, Rue Kessels 28-30, Brussels, tel.: ++32 22198079, www.fibif.be (​http:​/​​/​www.fibif.be​) (in Turkish only), Facebook page: www.facebook.com/belcika.islam.federasyonu (​http:​/​​/​www.facebook.com​/​belcika.islam.federasyonu​)). Coordinates Turkish Milli Görüş mosques.
-	Union of Islamic Cultural Centres in Belgium (Union des Centres Culturels Islamiques de Belgique, UCCIB, Rue Charles Demeer 1-3, 1020 Brussels, www.selimiye.be (​http:​/​​/​www.selimiye.be​)). Coordinates Turkish Sülyemancı mosques.
-	There are various local/provincial/regional mosques federations such as Union des Mosquées de Liège, Union des Mosquées de Bruxelles, Union des Mosquées du Hainaut, Union des Mosquées de Charleroi, Unie van Moskeeën en Islamitische Verenigingen in de Provincie Antwerpen (UMIVPA), etc.
-	European Council of Moroccan Oulemas (Conseil européen des Oulémas marocains, CEOM, Avenue Louise 275, 1000 Brussels, tel.: ++32 26444493, www.ceomeurope.eu (​http:​/​​/​www.ceomeurope.eu​) (in Arabic only)). The Council considers itself a source for intellectual and religious references for Moroccans living in Europe and a contributor to dialogue among cultures and religions in European societies.
-	Emdeo (Muslim Expo, Jan van Rijswijcklaan 191, 2020 Antwerp, tel.: ++32 484833181, http://muslimexpo.be (​http:​/​​/​muslimexpo.be​), Facebook page: www.facebook.com/moslimexpo (​..​/​..​/​..​/​..​/​AppData​/​Local​/​Temp​/​www.facebook.com​/​moslimexpo​), both mainly in Dutch, except when referring to the Expo held in Charleroi in 2016). This body is the organiser of the Muslim Expo in Antwerp and co-organiser of the one held in Charleroi in 2016.
-	League of Imams in Belgium (Ligue des Imams de Belgique, Avenue de Scheut 212, 1070 Brussels, no website. Facebook page: www.facebook.com/ligue.desimams (​http:​/​​/​www.facebook.com​/​ligue.desimams​)).
-	League of Muslims in Belgium (Ligue des Musulmans de Belgique, LMB, Rue Joseph Claes 69, 1060 Bruxelles, http://lmbonline.be (​http:​/​​/​lmbonline.be​)). Established in 2005, it has branches in Brussels, Liège, Verviers, Gent, and Antwerp, and is the co-organiser of the Brussels Muslim Fair.
-	Platform of Muslims in Belgium (Plateforme des Musulmans de Belgique, PMB,). It organises the Muslim Expo in Charleroi in 2016. The PMB contests the role, authority, and legitimacy of the EMB. 
-	Islamic Relief Belgium (26-28 Rue Ulens, 1080 Brussels, www.islamic-relief.be (​http:​/​​/​www.islamic-relief.be​). Facebook page: www.facebook.com/IRBelgium (​http:​/​​/​www.facebook.com​/​IRBelgium​)). Established around 1990 in Belgium and part of Islamic Relief Worldwide, it provides humanitarian support to various causes: fighting hunger, access to clean water in developing countries, and assisting orphans.
-	Islamic Assistance League (Ligue d’entraide islamique, LEI, 9 Rue Vanderstraeten, 1080 Brussels, http://alkhalil.be). Established 25 years ago, it is a large network of organisations including Al Khalil mosque, Al Khalil and La Plume schools, the Islamic Studies Institute (Institut des Etudes Islamiques, IEI), and the Wisdom Institute for Languages (Institut la Sagesse pour les Langues, ISL).
-	Belgian Association of Muslim Professionals (Association Belge des Professionnels Musulmans, ABPM, Rue de la Loi 42, 1040 Brussels, www.abpm.be (​http:​/​​/​www.abpm.be​)). The association develops contacts among Muslim professionals.
-	Muslim Rights Belgium (Rue du Jardinier 82, 1081 Brussels, www.mrb-online.be (​http:​/​​/​www.mrb-online.be​). Facebook page: www.facebook.com/muslims.rightsbelgium (​http:​/​​/​www.facebook.com​/​muslims.rightsbelgium​)). Established in 2012, it publishes an annual report on Islamophobia in Belgium (in French only).
-	Collective against Islamophobia in Belgium (Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en Belgique, CCIB, no address provided. tel.: ++32 484057977, www.islamophobia.be (​http:​/​​/​www.islamophobia.be​) reverts to the Facebook page www.facebook.com/islamophobia.ccib.be (​http:​/​​/​www.facebook.com​/​islamophobia.ccib.be​)). Another association with very similar aims to those of Muslim Rights Belgium (established in September 2014).
-	Empowering Belgian Muslims (EmBem, no address provided, Facebook page: www.facebook.com/pages/EmBeM/508355209273099 (​http:​/​​/​www.facebook.com​/​pages​/​EmBeM​/​508355209273099​)). A platform aiming at promoting cooperation and empowerment within Muslim communities in Belgium (established in 2012).
-	Union of Muslim Ministers in Belgium (Union des Ministres du Culte Musulman de Belgique, Rue de Hodimont 244, 4800 Verviers).
-	Association of Imams of Recognised Mosques (Association des Imams des Mosquées Reconnues).
-	Federation of Associations of Teachers of Islamic Religion (Fédération des Associations des Enseignants de Religion Islamique, www.religion-islamique.be/federation-ri (​http:​/​​/​www.religion-islamique.be​/​federation-ri​)). Created in March 2008 to, firstly, defend, represent, and promote teachers of Islamic religious education.
-	Islamic Denominational Education in Belgium (Enseignement Confessionnel Islamique de Belgique, ECIB, 138 Chaussée de Haecht, 1030 Brussels, tel.: ++ 32 27363739, www.po-ecib.be). Since 1989, it has established a few Muslim schools, recognised and financed by public authorities.
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